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ARTIC]~E

Hanclling Cases of Willful Exposure
Thro'ugh HIV Partner Counseling
and ]~eferral Services
1

James G. llodge, Jr., J.D., LL.M. * and Lawrence O. Gostin, J.D., LL.D.
(Hon.)**

L INTRODUCTION
In December, 1998, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued
comprehensive guidelines on partner counseling and referral services (PCRS) for individuals
living with HIV/AIDS.2 Though the terminology has changed, PCRS is based on partner notification/ the traditional public health practice
of assisting individuals infected with a communicable disea~e in notifying their sexual and/or
needle-sharing partners of the real or potential
exposure to C.isease. 4 As part of a comprehensive public health strategy (including testing
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center; Assistant Scientist, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health; Project Director, the Center for
Law and the Public's Health at Johns Hopkins and
Georgetown Universities.
**Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
Professor of Publ ic Health, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health; Director, the Center for Law and
the Public's Hec.lth at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown
Universities.
1. This article is substantially based on a report of the
same title prepan!d by the authors with funding assistance
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
While this scho: arly report discusses CDC and other
governmental policies and procedures, it does not represent
an official positi:m of these governmental entities. The
authors would like to thank the following individuals who
expertly reviewed and commented on an initial draft of the
report on which this article is based: Ronald O. Valdiserri,
David Holtgrave, Robert N. Kohmescher, David W. Purcell,
Dan Riedford, David Brownell, John Miles, Rick Steketee,

services, screening of sub-populations, reporting of cases of infectious disease, and medical
interventions for those infected),5 PCRS offers
significant public health benefits for individuals
living with HIV/AIDS, their partners, and the
community.6 Persons who may be unaware of
their risk are informed of their potential exposure to HIV.7 Notified partners are advised to
test for HIV and counseled about practicing
safer behaviors to avoid future exposure. 8
Those who choose to test and are found to be
infected can pursue early medical treatment

Terje Anderson, Lisa Speisseger, Robert Berke, Shepherd
Smith, Roland Foster, Scott Burris, Chris Collins, Helen Fox
Fields, Sean Bugg, Jeff S. Crowley, Beth Meyerson, Douglas
Morgan, Deborah von Zinkernagel, Brian McCormick, Julio
C. Abreu, Miguelina Maldonado, and Marilyn C. Moses.
They are also grateful to Mira Burghardt (JD Candidate,
Georgetown University Law Center) for her research
assistance.
2. Dlvs. OF HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HIV PARTNER COUNSELING
AND REFERRAL SERVICES - GUIDANCE (Dec. 30, 1998)
[hereinafter DHHS & CDC].
3. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing
the Veil of Secrecy in HIVIAIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 9,12-13 (1998).
4. Id.
5. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at ii.
6. Id. at § 1.4.
7. Id. at § 1.2.
8.Id.
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(which may substantially prolong their lives),9
practice preventive behaviors, and reduce their
own risk of becoming infected with other sexually-transmitted diseases.lO At the community
level, PCRS (in coordination with other public
health programs) can improve disease surveillance, identify high risk social sexual networks,
and contribute to the development of comprehensive public health programs to lower HIV
transmission rates. 11
PCRS begins when individuals seek HIV
counseling or testing through private care providers or publicly funded programs. 12 These individuals (or "clients") are offered professional
counseling services to assess and reduce their
risks of acquiring or transmitting HIV.13 Clients
are encouraged to volunteer specific information about their sex and needle-sharing partners, and to plan how and when partners are informed of their risk of exposure.1 4 Either the
client or the PCRS provider informs each located partner of his or her possible exposure to
HIV.IS Newly-informed partners are referred to
counseling, testing, and necessary social and
medical services, thus completing the PCRS cycle. 16
PCRS typically follows instances of infection resulting from unknowing or unintended
exposure to disease. However, partner counselors or public health authorities may discover

that a client or other person poses some danger
of exposing others to HIV and is not willing to
avert thqt risk. For example, a PCRS counselor
may be aware that a person who knows he is
infected with HIV has engaged or is presently
engaging in unsafe sexual or needle-sharing activity with partners who are unaware of the
risk.17 This information may be apparent from:
(1) counseling sessions with clients engaging in
such unsafe practices; (2) interviews with clients
who are partners of persons engaging in such
unsafe behaviors; or (3) information provided
by health care workers, mental health workers,
or law enforcement authorities. ls
In its PCRS Guidelines, CDC does not
fully address these cases of "willful exposure" of
HIV. For the purposes of this article, we define
"willful exposure" as the intentional act of a
competene 9 individual infected with HIV to expose others to HIV through unsafe sexual or
needle-sharing practices?O Our definition is intentionally narrow and meant to apply only to
individuals with HIV who knowingly engage in
certain risky or high risk behaviors. Thus, willful exposure does not necessarily involve HI Vinfected individuals who (1) are unaware of
their infection and thus unknowingly expose
others to HIV; (2) unintentionally expose others
to HIV (e.g. due to a faulty condom); (3) lack
understanding of the consequences of their

9. See A. Mark Isley, Health Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L.
REV. 981, 997 (1994) (noting that HlV -infected individuals
can "live and function longer with the disease") (citing Arthur S. Leonard, Ethical Challenges of HIV Infection in the
Workplace, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 53, 63
(1990». See also Mike Cooper, AIDS Deaths Drop for 1st
Time, U.S. Attributes 12% Decline in First Half of 1996 to
Better Treatment, Slowing of Epidemic, S.F. EXAM'R, Feb. 27,
1997, at Al (stating that experts also attribute the decline to
broadened access to effective treatment and care).
10. As the CDC suggests in its report, PCRS serves two
primary goals: (1) providing services to HIV-infected persons
and their sex and needle-sharing partners so they can avoid
infection or, if already infected, can prevent transmission to
others; and (2) helping partners gain earlier access to individualized counseling, HIV testing, medical evaluation, treatment, and other prevention services. DHHS & CDC, supra
note 2, at § 1.2.
11. ld. at § 1.4.
12. Id. at § 1.5.
13. Id.
14. Ideally, partners are prioritized (i.e. current spouses
and other sexual partners are notified before previous sexual
partners) and (1) informed of possible exposure to HIV; (2)
provided accurate information about HIV transmission and
prevention; (3) informed of the benefits of knowing one's
serostatus; (4) assisted in accessing counseling, testing, and

other support services; and (5) cautioned about revealing
their own or others' serostatus. [d. at § 3.3.
15. Id. at § 3.2.
16. [d.
17. Id. at § 3.4.2.
18. Id.
19. Whether an individual (e.g. a minor, a person with a
mental disability or substance abuse problem), is competent
for the purposes of the definition of willful exposure is a separate determination in accordance with state laws.
20. The willful exposure of others to HIV may occur in
many different ways. Individuals with knowledge of their
HIV infection may donate contaminated blood or other bodily fluids. The national screening of blood donations for HIV
has largely eliminated the risk of willful exposure through
blood donations. Individuals may also attempt to infect
others through biting, spitting, or splattering of blood. Although criminal charges have been brought against individuals with HIV who engage in these behaviors, factual and epidemiologic evidence have regularly demonstrated the low
risks involved in these contexts. Individuals with knowledge
of their HIV infection may also willfully expose others to infection through unsafe sexual or needle-sharing practices.
These are cases which PCRS counselors and public health departments are likely to face and thus, our definition of willful
exposure focuses almost exclusively on these instances.
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risky actiom: (e.g. those with a substantial
mental disabl1ities); (4) expose competent partners who as'Sume the risks (i.e. partners are
aware of the HIV status of the individual and
the potential risks associated with exposure); or
(5) may knowingly expose others to HIV, but
are not morally responsible for such exposures
(e.g. victims of domestic abuse, rape, or incest,
or minors engaged in commercial sex work)?l
Thus, cases of willful exposure (as we define
them) involve knowledgeable, competent, infected individuals who intentionally try to infect
unknowing partners.
Often th~se unsuspecting partners may be
heterosexual women?2 A well-publicized case
of willful exposure in Chautauqua and surrounding cou.nties in New York in 1998 involved an inc,ividual who allegedly had unsafe
sex with multiple female partners (most of
whom were minors) despite knowing he had
HIV and that HIV was transmissible to others

through unsafe sexual practices?3 After public
health and law enforcement authorities conducted their own investigations, a suspect was
detained in New York City and later pleaded
guilty to criminal charges of reckless endangerment (among others).24 At least a dozen women in Chautauqua County alone were infected
with HIV through this single individua1. 25 Similar cases have been documented in Tennessee,26
Missouri,27 and other states?S
Countless other documented and undocumented cases of willful exposure exist. Numerous studies suggest that some individuals infected with HIV who know they are infected
continue unsafe sexual or needle-sharing behaviors?9 While these studies vary in the percentages of unprotected and undisclosed exposures
found among individuals in differing populations, they cumulatively reveal a significant pattern of risk behaviors?O The impact of this pattern may be accentuated among heterosexual

21. While these examples do not fit within the definition of
willful exposure ;et forth in this report, specific guidance
concerning public health responses to such examples should
be consulted. Sa NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR LOCAL AND STATE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH STAFF, RESPONDING TO CONTINUED SEXUAL
RISK AND NEEDLE-SHARING RISK BEHAVIOR ON THE PART
OF PERSONS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE AWARE OF BEING
INFECTED WITH HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV)
(Draft as of March 21, 1999).
22. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 3.3.
23. Brian A. Brown, The Charge Is Murder, The Weapon
AIDS, WALL ST. L, Nov. 3, 1997, at A23; Shannon Brownlee
et aI., AIDS Comes to Small-town America, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 10, 1997, at 52; Jennifer Frey, Nushawn's
Girls, WASH. POST, June 1, 1999, at Cl. For an epidemiologic
review of this case, see Cluster of HIV-Positive Young Women-New York, i997-I998, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. (May 28, 1999), at 413.
24. These charges included (1) attempted assault in the second degree (on th,! theory that he intended to cause serious
physical injury to ~thers by engaging in unprotected sex despite knowing such behavior could infect others); and (2)
reckless endangerment in the first degree (on the theory that
he acted with depraved indifference to human life by having
unprotected sex).
25. Frey, supra 110te 23, at Cl.
26. See HIV-infected Woman Slept with 50 Men, WASH.
TIMES, July 31, 19 ' )8, at A13.
27. See Kristina Sauerwein, Man's Deadly Legacy Triggers
Frantic Race, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 1997, at

San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1993,45 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY

AI.
28. See Phillip :vtorris, An Unlikely Bearer of HIV and
Words of Warning, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 11, 2000, at 9B.
see also Kevin Mayhood, Boy, 15, Faces Felony Charge After
Spitting in Officer'1· Pop, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 3, 2001,
at OAl.

29. See, e.g., Continued Sexual Risk Behavior Among HIVSeropositive, Drug- Using Men Atlanta; Washington, D. c.; and

WKLY. REP. 151, 151 (1996) (study of 116 HIV-seropositive
and illicit drug users revealed that 28% reported having vaginal or anal sex without a condom in past 30 days, 32% had
not disclosed their serostatus to all partners, and 63% had
partners of unknown or negative serostatus); William W.
Darrow et aI., Impact of HIV Counseling and Testing on

HIV-Infected Men Who Have Sex with Men: The South Beach
Health Survey, 2 AIDS AND BEHAV. 115 (1998) (29% of
HI V-seropositive men had engaged in unprotected insertive
anal intercourse in past year with partners with HIV negative
or unknown HIV status); Christine J. De Rosa & Gary
Marks, Preventive Counseling of HIV-Positive Men and Setf-

Disclosure of Serostatus to Sex Partners: New Opportunities
for Prevention, 17 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 224 (1998) (77% of
HI V-seropositive men with HIV-unknown status partners
failed to disclose their infection prior to sexual practices);
Jeffrey D. Fisher et aI., Dynamics of Sexual Risk Behavior in
HIV-lnfected Men Who Have Sex with Men, 2 AIDS AND
BEHAV. 101, 106 (1998) (research findings based on surveys
and interviews suggest that risky behaviors occur with some
frequency); Carol F. Kwiatkowski & Robert E. Booth, HIVSeropositive Drug Users and Unprotected Sex, 2 AIDS AND
BEHAV. 151, 156 (1998) (47% of HI V-positive, sexually-active injection drug users (IDUs) reported having unprotected
sex in past 6 months); Lisa R. Metsch et aI., Continuing Risk

Behaviors Among HIV-Seropositive Chronic Drug Users in
Miami, Florida, 2 AIDS AND BEHAV. 161, 167 (1998) (approximately one-third of HIV-positive injectors and one-half
of HIV-positive non-injectors continue to have unprotected
sex and approximately one-third of HIV-positive injectors
are continuing to engage in risky injecting practices).
30. Furthermore, many of these studies are based on selfreported actions of individuals with HIV. Actual rates of unsafe behaviors may be higher. Although it is critical from the
public health perspective to know the serostatus of partners
with individuals with HIV, this information is often unknown. Some studies have begun focusing on HIV-seropositive individuals' actual behaviors and knowledge of partner
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women31 (especially minorities )32 where rates of
HIV infection have escalated despite lowering
rates of infection among other groups in the
past decade. 33 HIV/AIDS remains among the
leading causes of death among women between
the ages of 25-44,34 many of whom are infected
through partners for which they are unaware of
their HIV status?5
Cases of willful exposure reveal the existing and future risks to the public health (especially women) which may be presented by individuals who willfully expose others to HIV
through unsafe sexual or needle-sharing behaviors. In response to a documented case of willful
exposure, a PCRS counselor or other public
health official may, in his or her professional
judgment, decide to act to avert a legitimate
public health threat to known or unknown persons in the community. Yet handling such cases
raises difficult issues in law, ethics, and public
health practice.
Public health authorities may be unable or
ill-equipped to successfully control risks of this
type for several reasons: (1) they may lack sufficient resources to properly investigate these
cases;36 (2) they may lack knowledge or jurisdiction over the individual who willfully exposes
others to HIV once his behaviors extend into

other communities;37 and (3) they are bound to
maintain the confidentiality of sensitive information they obtain from PCRS?8 How do
health care workers and public health departments balance the duty to maintain the privacy
of public health information related to PCRS
against their obligation to fulfill a partner's
right to know of their exposure to infection?
What are the legal powers and duties of public
health departments to protect the health and
safety of individuals as part of their mission to
protect the public health? What is the role of
the criminal law concerning persons who may
intentionally or knowingly attempt to infect
others with HIV or other communicable diseases?
This article addresses these legal and ethical questions which PCRS counselors and public health departments must assess in responding to these encounters. In PART II, we
examine issues underlying the tension between
the right to privacy of sensitive health data and
the right to know about risks of which an individual is unaware. PCRS attempts to resolve
this tension by disclosing exposure-related information to partners to the extent possible
without infringement of the infected individual's autonomy and privacy. Legal and ethical

serostatus. Additional epidemiological work in this area,
however, remains to be done.
31. See Center for Disease Control National Center for
HIV, STD and TB Prevention - Divs. of HIV/AIDS Prevention, 12 Surveillance Rep. Estimated female adult! adolescent
AIDS incidence, by exposure category and year of diagnosis,
1997, 1998 and 1999, U.S., available at http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/stats/hasr1201l figlO.htm (last modified Dec. 6, 2000).
32. See Center for Disease Control National Center for
HIV, STD and TB Prevention - Divs. of HIV/AIDS Prevention, 12 Surveillance Rep. Estimated female adult! adolescent
AIDS incidence, by exposure category and race/ethnicity, diagnosed in 1999, and cumulative totals through 1999, U.S.,
Surveillence Rep. 12, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/
hasr1201ltable 21.htm (last modified Dec. 6, 2000).
33. See CDC, HIVIAIDS Among US Women: Minority
and Young Women at Continuing Risk [available at http://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/factslwomen.htm] (last modified Jan
31,2001) [hereinafter, HIV/AIDS Among US Women]:
HIV infection among U.S. women has increased significantly over the last decade, especially in communities of
color. ... [I]n the United States, between 120,000 and
160,000 adult and adolescent females are living with
HIV infection, including those with AIDS. [From 19921998] ... a growing proportion of women were living
with AIDS, reflecting the ongoing shift in populations
affected by the epidemic. In 1992, women accounted for
14% of persons living with AIDS-by 1999, the proportion had grown to 20%. In just over a decade, the pro-

portion of all AIDS cases reported among adult and adolescent women more than tripled, from 7% in 1985 to
23% in 1998. The epidemic has increased most dramatically among women of color. African American and Hispanic women together represent less than one-fourth of
all U.S. women, yet they account for more than threefourths (77%) of AIDS cases reported to date among
women in our country. In 1999 alone ... , women of
color represented an even higher proportion of cases.
While AIDS-related deaths among women were decreasing as of 1998, largely as a result of recent advances
in HIV treatment, HIV/Aids remains among the leading
causes of death for U.S. women aged 25-44.
Id.; See also Pascale M. Wortley & Patricia L. Fleming, AIDS
in Women in the United States: Recent Trends, 278 JAMA 911
(Sept. 17, 1997).
34. HIVIAIDS Among US Women, supra note 33. HIV is
ranked as the 5th for women age 25-44 in 48 National Vital
Statistics Report (July 24 2000) available at http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/fstats/deaths.htm/pdf/nvs48 11_8.pdf.
35. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2 (While AIDS-related
deaths among women are now decreasing, largely as a result
of recent advances in HIV treatment, HIV/AIDS remains
among the leading causes of death for U.S. women aged 2544.).
36. Id. § 1.3.
37. Jd. § 2.2.
38. Jd. § 4.3.
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duties also suggest that PCRS counselors may
be obliged to disclose individually-identifiable
information to satisfy statutory duties or privileges to warn or to accomplish legitimate public
health purpmes.
PART III briefly examines the responsibilities of governmental agencies to protect the
public health regarding cases of willful exposure, as well as the circumstances in which an
individual can be criminally prosecuted. The intentional exposure of another to a communicable disease is deemed a crime in most jurisdictions, whether under (1) general criminal law
(including charges of murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary or reckless manslaughter,
assault and battery, reckless endangerment, or
attempts of ea.ch of these crimes); (2) STD-specific offenses; or (3) HIV-specific offenses. Although the use of criminal law in the interests of
preventing the spread of any disease is generally considered contrary to public health practice, which emphasizes the ethic of voluntarism,
and should only be a final resort, cases may
arise where criminal sanctions are appropriate,
even essential.
In PART IV, we present our recommendations for the procedures and options PCRS
counselors and public health departments
should consider before, during, and after taking
any action concerning cases of willful exposure.
These include: (1) developing a public health
plan to clarify :public health duties and responsibilities; (2) creating strong protections for privacy and secu:~ity of public health information
related to i::1.vestigations; (3) determining
through sound investigation the existence of a
health threat; (4) seeking legal assistance the
moment a case of willful exposure is detected;
(5) pre-examining the public health impact
before any action is taken; (6) advising the suspected individual before public action is taken;
(7) choosing the least restrictive alternative

needed to avert a risk to the public health; and
(8) disclosing information about a willful exposure in accordance with one of three options.
These options include disclosing information to
persons potentially at risk, criminal justice or
law enforcement authorities, or, in extremely
rare circumstances, the media. A brief conclusion follows.

39.Id.
40.Id.
41. Id.
42.Id.
43.Id.
44. See MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH PRIVACY ACT
(1999) available at www.critpath.orglmsphpa/modellaw5.htm

THO), and the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL).
45. Id. § 5-1Ol.
46. Id. art. V, § 5-101[b].
47. For definitions of privacy, confidentiality, and security,
see LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER,
DuTY, RESTRAINT 127-28 (2000).
48. Lawrence o. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The

[hereinafter MSPHPA]. The project was sponsored by" the
Centers for Disea:;e Control and Prevention (CDC), the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (AS-

II. LEGAL AND ETHICAL THEORIES
UNDERLYING PRIVACY AND THE
RIGHT TO KNOW
In its PCRS Guidelines, CDC specifically
notes the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of all persons involved in PCRS?9
CDC recommends that (1) attempts to contact
sex or needle-sharing partners should be confidential to the highest degree possible;40 (2)
partners should be informed of their exposure
to HIV privately;41 (3) partners should be provided only that amount of information which is
justified, which is never to include the client's
gender, name, or physical description, or time,
type, or frequency of exposure;42 and (4) PCRS
counselors must not reveal any confidential information about partners to clients. 43 Preserving the security of personal information is as
important as protecting privacy. Previously,
CDC has issued guidelines concerning the security of HIV and other public health information held by public health departments,44 including protecting such data through physical
and technological means,45 restricting access to
those public health authorities which need the
information, and prohibiting unnecessary handling or transportation of the information. 46
Protecting individual privacy and security,47 especially concerning sensitive health data
like HIV status, is synergistic with accomplishing public health goals. 48 Respecting privacy interests allows individuals to feel secure in volunteering sensitive health or other information

"Names Debate": The Case for national HIV Reporting in the
United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 683 (1998).

HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 49 2001-2002

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

50

[Vol. 23:45 2001]

about themselves or others. 49 Failure to protect
personal privacy may lead to unwarranted discrimination or stigmatization against individuals, thus discouraging their participation in public health efforts.5o
Individual privacy, however, may not extend so far as to protect individuals who place
others at risks of which they are unaware. Legal
duties to disclose and warn of exposure to infectious diseases,51 as well as ethical principles of
beneficence (the duty to do good)52 and nonmaleficence (the duty to not harm),53 support a
person's right to know of his exposure to HIV.
A resulting dilemma arises from the inherent
tension between HIV-infected individuals'
rights to privacy and their partners' rights to
know.
These observations are perhaps no more
relevant in public health practice than as applied in PCRS. PCRS encourages the disclosure of exposure-related information to partners,54 provided such disclosure is made without
infringing on an infected individual's autonomy
and privacy to the extent possible. 55 Thus,
PCRS recognizes the value of providing information to further the right to know (of partners) while protecting privacy (of individuals
with HIV) by only disclosing non-identifiable
data.
Yet, at times; PCRS cannot satisfy either
goal. Individual privacy may be compromised
where a partner notified of exposure deduces
the actual source. Consider, for example, a monogamous, married woman who is notified by a
county public health department of her exposure to HIV. She has not had any sexual partners beside her husband for over 20 years. She
does not inject illicit drugs. She has had "unsafe" sex with her husband, and may affirmatively conclude that he must have exposed her

Though protecting health information privacy is increasingly important within a modern
public health information infrastructure which

49. See id.
50. See Ferdinand Schoeman, AIDS and Privacy, in AIDS
& ETHICS 240, 241 (Frederic G. Reamer ed., 1992). People
infected with HIV have much to fear besides the disease. Because of the association of AIDS with promiscuity, primarily
homosexual but also heterosexual, or the self-abandonment
connected with intravenous (IV) drug usage, any adult with
AIDS is suspected of degeneracy. . . . The level of public
ignorance about the disease, the deficiency of scientific understanding surrounding aspects of its transmission, and the
general hysteria about AIDS mean that people diagnosed as
HIV positive must face social, economic, and medical hurdles
no one with such dire medical prospects should have to confront. ... A diagnosis of HIV infection, or even suspicion of

this, is sufficient in some cases to deprive people of housing,
employment, life and health insurance, social tolerance, routine and even emergency medical treatment like mouth-tomouth resuscitation, schooling, social contacts, friendships,
the right to travel in and out of countries-a social identity.
51. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Md. App.
1988).
52. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 259-325 (4th ed. 1994).
53. Id. at 189.
54. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 1.5.
55. Id. at §§ 3.1.1, 4.3.
56. See id. at § 1.5.

to HIV, thus breaching his entitlement to individual privacy. Although it is highly contestable whether the husband's privacy right has any
moral priority over her right to know, the end
result of PCRS is that his privacy interest (in
avoiding the disclosure of his HIV status) is revealed through PCRS. 56
Coextensively with a patient's right to privacy, an individual's right to know may be
squandered where notification of exposure to
HIV is replete of the source of the exposure.
Think about a woman who is notified of her exposure to HIV but not the source. She injects
heroin with friends, and concludes that one of
her needle-sharing partners must have HIV.
She refuses to share needles in the future, but is
oblivious to the actual source of her exposure,
her boyfriend of two years. Although she will
have been advised to practice safe behaviors
(including safe sexual behaviors), she may continue to place herself at risk of exposure
through unsafe sexual behavior due to her incorrect assumption that her drug behaviors
must have placed her at risk. In these scenarios,
rights to privacy and to know are compromised
through PCRS.
In the following sections we explain laws
supporting the privacy rights of individuals and
the rights to know of their partners in the context of partner notification in order to demonstrate the fundamental tension at stake when
PCRS counselors or public health departments
are faced with a case of willful exposure.
A. Legal Rights to Privacy
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features regu.lar exchanges of health data,57 individual privacy is not necessarily paramount to
communal interests justifying such exchanges
and individual interests justifying some disclosures. A primary communal interest underlying
the use and disclosure of individual health data
is the protection of public health, which, many
suggest, cannot be thwarted through restrictive
privacy provi5ions. 58 Ideally, a balance between
individual pri.vacy and communal interests can
be attained through rigorous legal safeguards of
health information,59 expressed through federal
or state constItutional protections 60 of health information, privacy legislation, or case law. 61 As
discussed in this section, however, existing legal
safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and inconsistent.

51

Scholars have debated the existence and
extent of a constitutional right to informational
privacy indepl~ndent of the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures. 62 To some, judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to informational privacy is
particularly important since the government is a

primary collector and disseminator of health information. 63 As a result, individuals need protection from the government itself without resort to federal or state legislation. An effective
constitutional remedy is the surest method to
shield them from unauthorized government acquisition or disclosure of personal information.
Unfortunately, a right to informational privacy is not specifically provided for in the Constitution. 64 The Supreme Court, however, has
judicially recognized a limited right to informational privacy as a liberty interest within the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 65
A flexible test has been utilized by courts
balancing government invasion of privacy
against the strength of the government interest. 66 Courts have chosen not to interfere with
traditional governmental information collection, provided the government articulates a
valid societal purpose and employs reasonable
security measures. 67 Unquestionably, the government could enunciate a valid societal purpose in collection and disclosure of health information, including enhancing public health and
lawenforcement. 68

57. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 C. PA. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1991).
58. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge, Jr.,
Genetic Privacy alld the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 36-39 (1999).
59. See id. at 41. The law is merely one tool to improve
individual privacy protections. Internal privacy policies of
health care providers, data processors, and other private sector entities which acquire, use, and disclose identifiable
health data can greatly impact individual expectations of the
privacy of their health information. The same can be said for
voluntarily-execut ~d policies of governmental holders of
data, including public health agencies, researchers, universities and academic centers, and other commissions or agencies. Adherence to ethical principles and human rights documents in support c,f the privacy of individual health data may
also lead to greater privacy protections. Ultimately, however, where government and the private sector fail to administer sufficient privacy protections, the law may guide, if not
require, such protections.
60. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren
and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
479, 508-09 (1990)
61. See, e.g., Wtalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-602 (1977);
Nixon v. Adminis':rator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
457-65 (1977).
62. See, e.g., Kleimer, supra note 57; Turkington, supra
note 60; Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991).
63. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 57, at 4-6.

64. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 495-98 (1995); see also Gostin,
supra note 58, at 42.
65. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. 425.
In Whalen, the Court considered "whether the constitutional
right to privacy encompasses the collection, storage, and dissemination" of public health information by the government.
See Gostin, supra note 58, at 42; see also Whalen 429 U.S. at
591. The Court recognized "the threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files."
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. No violation was found in
Whalen because the Court determined that the state had sufficient "standards and procedures for protecting the privacy
of sensitive medical information." Id.; see also Gostin, supra
note 58, at 42.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit held that
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health was
entitled to receive the medical records of private employees
exposed to toxic substance, subject to their informed consent.
The court enunciated five factors to be balanced in determining the scope of the constitutional right to informational privacy: (1) the type of record and the information it contains,
(2) the potential for harm in any unauthorized disclosure, (3)
the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the
record was generated, (4) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent non-consensual disclosure, and (5) the degree of need
for access (i.e., a recognizable public interest).
67. Id.
68. See generally Gostin, supra note 58, at 42.

1. Constitutional Right to Privacy

HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 51 2001-2002

52

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

The right to privacy under the federal and
state constitutions is, of course, limited to state
action. As long as the federal or state government itself collects information or requires
other entities to collect it, state action will not
be a central obstacle. Even so, the constitutional right to privacy, in the context of public
health, has proven to be nominal, especially in
instances where, as with PCRS, government
policies protect individual privacy to the degree
possible and individuals are not compelled to
comply.

eral regulations require privacy protections in
relation to the treatment of persons for drug or
alcohol dependency in federally-funded facilities 73 and the administration of human subject
research. 74
Most states have passed privacy statutes
that mimic the federal Privacy Aces and
FOIA,76 and, thus, apply only to state collections of data. A few states have enacted comprehensive medical information privacy acts. 77
These laws provide broad protections of health
information acquired, collected, used, or disclosed within the state. 78 States have also
passed disease-specific privacy laws which set
forth stringent privacy and security protections
for certain types of information, including medical information concerning one's HIV status 79
or other sexually-transmitted disease,8o genetic
information,81 information utilized in medical
research (such as state cancer registries), or
public health information. 82
Though existing federal and state privacy
statutes and regulations are meaningful and
serve valuable ends, they collectively represent
a patchwork effort to address privacy and security concerns of individuals in their health information. These statutes do not comprehensively
protect health information regardless of its subject or holder. Some kinds of data are treated as
super-confidential, while other data are virtually unprotected. Many state health information privacy laws struggle to balance competing
interests underlying the acquisition, use, and
disclosure of identifiable health information between individual privacy and warranted, communal uses of health information. 83 Our model
state privacy proposal, the Model State Public

2. Legislative and Administrative
Protections

Statutory law at the federal, state, and local
levels protects health information privacy in various settings where information concerning
willful exposure cases may arise, namely among
health care workers, PCRS counselors, or STD
or other publicly operated or funded health
clinics. The existing level of privacy protections
depends on the type and holder of information.
A growing number of statutes and regulations protecting privacy have been considered
or enacted by state and federal legislatures. 69
Several statutes and regulations protecting privacy of health information have been enacted
by the federal government. The Privacy Act of
1974 requires federal agencies to utilize "fair information practices with regard to the collection, use, or dissemination of systematized
records," including health data?O The Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966 requires the
federal government to disseminate "various information 71 but exempts from disclosure several
categories of records which include personallyidentifiable health information."n Other fed69. See Gostin, supra note 64, at 499-508; See also Gostin,
supra note 58, at 43.
70. 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(I)-(3), (6) (1994); See Gostin, supra
note 58, at 44.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
72. Id. at § 552 (b )(6); Gostin, supra note 58, at 44.
73. 42 U.S.c. § 290dd-2 (1994).
74. 45 c.F.R. §§ 46.101-404 (2000).
75. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 2001) (mimics Privacy Act).
76. See, e.g., MISS. CODE §§ 25-61-1 to 25-61-17 (1999)
(mimics FOIA).
77. See, e.g., CAL. Ov. CODE §§ 56 - 56.37 (West 1982 &
Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.02.005 70.02.904 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
78. See id.
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79. See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 AM.
J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining state legislation dealing
with HIV related problems in medical privacy laws).
80. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health
Law, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 461, 463-65 (1986).
81. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 58.
82. See Lawrence O. Gostin et aI., The Public Health Information Infrastructure, 275 JAMA 1921 (1996).
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-2 (2001) (requiring
health and social workers to report notifiable diseases, but
prohibiting the use of that information for any but public
health purposes); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.505 (West Supp.
2001) (requiring consideration of the effects of privacy standards within health insurance on care and disease management programs).
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Health Privacy Act (MSPHPA)84 (which specifically concerrcs public health information), attempts to rea.ch this balance by recognizing individual and communal interests in identifiable
public health data. The MSPHPA empowers
people to aGcess, inspect, and amend their
health information;85 learn the ways in which it
is used and disclosed;86 request a record of disclosures;87 and seek criminal or civil sanctions
for actions ir.consistent with the ACt. 88 Coextensively, the Act allows public health agencies
to acquire, collect, and use identifiable health
information 30 long as such information is
needed to accomplish legitimate public health
purposes. 89 Disclosures of identifiable data
outside of public health may be made for any
purpose with advance, written informed consent,90 but for only a few, narrow purposes without informed consent. 91 Though states have
failed to uniformly implement modern privacy
protections as suggested in the MSPHPA, many
support comprehensive national health information privacy legislation or administrative regulations.
Future federal health information privacy
legislation or regulations mandated by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA?2 may provide a
floor for protections. HIPAA seeks to reduce

the administrative and financial burdens of
health care by standardizing the electronic
transmission of health-related data. 93 In addition to security provisions concerning electronic
health information, HIPAA requires Congress
to pass legislation setting uniform standards for
the transmission of health insurance information. 94 While several health information privacy
bills have been considered by Congress,95 no action to date has been taken.
In the absence of Congressional action,
HIPAA requires that the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) draft and implement administrative regulations. 96 While
DHHS would prefer that Congress pass privacy
legislation,97 the agency has issued regulations
that may reflect the eventual national regulatory framework for protecting health information privacy.98 DHHS' regulations focus on five
key principles: (1) BOUNDARIES - health care
information should be disclosed for health purposes only (e.g., treatment, payment, or other
health care operations), with limited exceptions;99 (2) SECURITY - health information
should not be distributed unless the patient authorizes it or there is a clear legal basis for doing so, subject to the authorized need for information. lOo Those who receive such information
must safeguard it;lOl (3) CONSUMER CONTROL -

84. See MSPHPA, supra note 44.
8S. Id. §§ 6-101 - 104.
86. Id. §§ 2-101 - 102, 4-108 - 109, 6-101.
87. Id. § 4-109.
88. Id. §§ 7-10:. - lOS.
89. A 'legitimal e public health purpose' means a population-based activity or individual effort primarily aimed
at the prevention of injury, disease, or premature mortality, or the promotion of health in the community, including (a) assessing the health needs and status of the
community through public health surveillance and epidemiological w:earch, (b) developing public health policy, and (c) responding to public health needs and emergencies.
Id. § 1-103(9).
90. Id. § 4-103.
91. Disclosures without informed consent by public health
agencies or secondary recipients may only be made: (1) "directly to the individual;" (2) "to appropriate federal agencies
or authorities;" (3) "to health care personnel in a medical
emergency when necessary to protect the health or life of the
person who is the ~,ubject of the information;" (4) pursuant to
a court order sought exclusively by public health agencies in
light of a clear danger to an individual or public health; (S) to
appropriate agenc,es performing health oversight functions;
or (6) to identify it deceased individual, determine the manner of death, or provide information where the deceased is a
prospective organ donor. Id. at §§ 4-104 - 107.

92. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
93. See id.
94. [d. § 264; see also Jane Harman, Topics for Our Times:
New Health Care Data - New Horizons for Public Health, 88
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1021 (July 1998).
9S. See, e.g., Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 1999, S. S78, 106th Congo (1999); Medical Information Protection Act of 1998, S. 2609, lOSth Congo (1998);
Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of
1998, S. 1921, 10Sth Congo (1998); Medical Information Privacy and Security Act, S. 1368, 10Sth Congo (1998); Consumer Health and Research Technology (CHART) Protection Act, H.R. 3900, lOSth Congo (1998); Medical Privacy in
the Age of New Technologies Act of 1997, H.R. 181S, lOSth
Congo (1998); Fair Information Practices Act of 1997, H.R.
S2, lOSth Congo (1998).
96. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
97. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY RECOMMENDATIONS (1997) available at hUp:llwww.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
privrecs.htm.
98. [d.

99. Id. at § 164.S02
100. See id.
101. See id.
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persons are entitled to know of the existence
and purposes in which their health information
is being used.102 They are also entitled to correct misinformation in their health records;l03
(4) ACCOUNTABILITY - those who improperly
hold, distribute, or use health information
should be criminally punished, especially when
such actions are for monetary gain. Individuals
affected by such actions should have civil recourse; and (5) PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY - privacy interests of individuals must not override
national priorities of public health, medical research, health services research, quality assurance, health care fraud and abuse, and law enforcement in general. These regulations, when
implemented in April 2003, will not preempt all
state health information privacy laws. 104 Rather,
only those state laws which conflict with or are
less protective of federal privacy rights would
be preempted. State laws which are more protective of privacy, such as some disease-specific
laws, would survive.

vacy,,,108 "breach of implied term of contract,,,109 and "breach of fiduciary relationship. ,,110 These duties, however, are not
absolute. Disclosures without individual consent may lawfully be made to protect third parties from identifiable harm,111 to report information for public health purposes as required
by state law,112 or sometimes to address medical
emergencies. 113 Thus, the utility of duties of
confidentiality in the context of PCRS is limited.

3. Common Law Protections
Modern privacy law and proposals hinge
on a fundamental principle that identifiable
health data be disclosed only with informed
consent. This principle owes its inception to the
common law duty of confidentiality of certain
health care professionals (generally physicians)
not to disclose health information concerning
patients. CDC's PCRS Guidelines specifically
adopt a duty of confidentiality between counselors and clients. \05 Unwarranted disclosures
may subject responsible parties to civil liability
under several legal theories,106 including
"breach of confidentiality,,,107 "invasion of pri102.
103.
104.
Health

See id. § 164.520.
See id. § 164.526.
Lise Rybowksi, Protecting the Confidentiality of
Information, NAT'L HEALTH POL'y. F. 1, 16-17 (July
1998), available at http://www.nhpf.org.
105. See supra text accompanying note 20.
106. See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431,436
(S.c. Ct. App. 1997); Gostin, supra note 64, at 508-11; Gostin
& Hodge, supra note 3, at 42-43.
107. Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
108. McCormick, 494 S.E.2d at 436.
109. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp.
793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668,
674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
110. Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 532
N.E.2d 327,331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177
A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
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B. A Partner's Right to Know
While constitutional, statutory, and common law rules concerning health information
privacy support an individual's autonomous
right to control the disclosure of personal information,114 these provisions, as we suggest
above, are not absolute. 115 Individual privacy
may justifiably be limited where other persons
have a legitimate right to know the information.
Partner notification furthers the right to know
despite the inevitable infringement, whether
slight or substantial, of individual privacy.
Though often associated with the notification of
persons who are at risk of becoming infected
with a communicable disease,116 "partner notification has at least three distinct, if at times
overlapping, meanings: (1) contact tracing (e.g.
PCRS); (2) the duty of infected persons to disclose their infection to a sexual partner; and (3)
the duty of health care providers to warn of sexual and other risks to the partners of their infected patients. ,,117
The second meaning of partner notification
(the duty to disclose) recognizes an individual's
ethical and legal obligation to disclose his HIV
111. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.15.136 (Mitchie 2000)
(allowing disclosure of information concerning persons with
Thberculosis ).
113. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 81.046(c) (Vernon 2001) (allowing the release of "[m]edical
or epidemiological information ... to the extent necessary in
a medical emergency to protect the health or life of the person identified in the information"). Id.
114. See supra II.
115. See supra n.B.
116. See DHHS & CDC, supra note 2.
117. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 14.
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infection to a sexual or needle-sharing partner
or to reasonably protect the partner from avoidable health risks. Stated alternatively, if it is
foreseeable that a person's behavior will cause
harm to another, that person has a duty to take
reasonable steps (or due care) to avoid such behavior. In this context, due care requires at a
minimum the obligation to disclose one's condition to othen. at risk of exposure, including sexual or needle-sharing partners. 1lS If an individual fails to fu:.fill the duty to disclose, sexual and
needle-sharing partners can recover tort damages through civil actions brought on theories of
"assault or battery, fraud or misrepresentation,
infliction of emotional distress, seduction, and
negligence."u9 When an individual informs his
sexual or nee dIe-sharing partners of his HIV infection and the partner engages in risky behaviors with thelnfected individual, the partner essentially assumes the risk (and consequences)
of such behaviors.
The third meaning of partner notification
derives from the common law doctrine known
as a "power or duty to warn" (more accurately
termed the "power or duty to protect,,).120
Through conversations with the infected patient, a physician or other health care worker
(HCW) may conclude that certain persons are
at risk of contracting HIV. Under the duty to
warn, the HeW may have the power (i.e. permission) or duty to inform a foreseeable third
party of her exposure to infection if an infected
individual reflses to inform his partner, regardless of whether the patient consents to such no-

tification.121 Even where a HCW is unaware of
the existence of such partners, a HCW's failure
to advise infected patients of the potential to infect others is actionable negligence when
brought by a third party infected by the patient. 122 In the case of HIV infections, duty to
warn statutes (depending on the state) typically
require sex or needle-sharing partners to be notified only if (1) there is a significant risk of
transmission, (2) the patient cannot or will not
contact the partner, and (3) the HCW has notified the patient of his or her intent to notify
specified partners. 123
Where the HCW exercises a power or duty
to warn, a breach of the duty of patient confidentiality likely will occur. Significant legal and
ethical dilemmas arise from this conflict. To
what extent should patient confidentiality be
sacrificed in the performance of the duty to
warn? Many states have attempted to resolve
this question by statutorily recognizing a privilege (versus a duty) to warn others of a patient's infectious condition. "Privilege to warn"
statutes 124 differ from state to state in three key
components: (1) the voluntariness of disclosure;
(2) the scope of disclosure; and (3) the legal duties imposed. Some statutes give HCWs the discretion to decide whether to notify a patient's
contacts.
For example, laws passed in California and
New York provide that a physician may notify a
contact if the physician reasonably believes a

118. A crucial :.ssue is whether it is reasonably foreseeable
that sexual contact or needle sharing might harm one's partner. In general, reasonable persons who know or should
know that they have HIV must communicate this fact to a
partner prior to sexual relations. An individual's knowledge
of infection can be actual (an individual has specific knowledge of his HIV Hatus based on, for example, a positive test
result) or constn.ctive (an individual knew or should have
known of his HIV infection due to his risky behaviors, early
clinical symptom~., or other knowledge which a reasonable
person would equate with having HIV infection). While
courts agree that a duty to disclose follows an individual's
actual knowledge of his infection, imposing such a duty is difficult where a pelson is specifically unaware of his HIV status, but may be imputed to have constructive knowledge of
infection. Most eJurts have resisted imposing a duty to disclose unless the person actually knows of his infected status
since an individual with HIV may be asymptomatic for
months or years ~:iven HIV's long latency period.
119. See Gostir. and Hodge, supra note 3, at 38-39.

120. Christine E. Stenger, Note, Taking Tarasoff Where No
One Has Gone Before: Looking al "Duty to Warn" Under the
AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 471, 494 (1996).
121. Ronald Bayer, PhD. & Kathleen E. Toomey, MD,
MPH., HIV Prevention and the Two Faces of Partner Notification, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158 (1992).
122. Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr.
2d 518, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
123. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 3, at 44.
124. In addition to modifying preexisting confidentiality
statutes, states enacted statutes which specifically guarantee
the confidentiality of STD or HIV status. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 56.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) (protecting physician-patient confidentiality); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 120705 (West 1996) (protecting STD information); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120820 (West 1996) (protecting
HIV information); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101
(Mitchie 2000); 410 ILL. COMPo STAT. 50/3 (West 1997); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.103 (Vernon 2001).
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significant risk of transmission exists,125 believes
the patient will not warn the partner/ 26 and notifies the patient of the physician's intent to
warn the person at risk. 127 Most statutes allow
notification of spouses, sexual partners, or needle-sharing partners. 128 Some statutes limit
warnings to an individual's spouse or cohabitating sexual partner of over one year. 129 Most
states provide immunity for HCWs who decide
not to disclose;l3O others provide no protection
from potential liability,131 essentially failing to
resolve the conflict between the duty to warn
and the duty of confidentiality.
Even if the legal and ethical duties of
HCWs to protect individual privacy are defined
in some states, the role of PCRS counselors in
cases of willful exposure is different from that
of HCWs. Unlike HCWs who need information for clinical purposes and are often the first
to determine HIV status, PCRS counselors acquire such information voluntarily from individuals to accomplish public health purposes.l32
While HCWs may often be private sector employees, PCRS counselors are likely state or local government employees and thus, must uphold constitutional privacy and other
protections. HCWs share a distinct relationship
with patients from which the law and ethics
have traditionally recognized affirmative duties.
PCRS counselors do not "owe" clients these duties under the same legal theories (although
they may assume these duties as part of their
public health practice).
Like HCWs, however, PCRS counselors
may often find themselves at the center of the
conflict between protecting privacy and furthering the right to know.133 PCRS counselors are
required to maintain the privacy and security of
client identity under federal and state constitutional, statutory, and regulatory laws. 134 Yet, a

central objective of PCRS is the notification of
unsuspecting persons at risk of exposure to
HIV.135 In cases of willful exposure, disclosing
identifiable information about individuals may
be needed to stop practices which are injurious
to the public health for several reasons: (1)
there may be insufficient information to allow
PCRS counselors to directly notify partners of
such individuals engaging in unsafe sexual or
needle-sharing behaviors; (2) knowledge of the
individual's identity may be critical to enabling
unsuspecting individuals to protect themselves;
and (3) the individual's behavior may be criminal in nature. This need to disclose identifiable
information by PCRS counselors, however,
must be weighed against legal and ethical duties
to not disclose identifiable patient information
as well as other legal interests, including the potential to resort to criminal enforcement, which
we discuss below.

125. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(a) (West
1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a)(2) (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 2001).
126. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121015(b);
§ 2782(4)(a)(3).
127. Id. § 121015(b); § 2782(4)(a)(4).
128. See, e.g., id. § 121015(a); §§ 2780(10), 2782(4)(a)(1);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584(a) (West & Supp. 2001); FLA.
STAT. ch. 456.061(1) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-947(g) (2001).
129. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.282(1)(a)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 2000).
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 456.061(2) (West 2001);
IDAHO CODE § 39-610(5) (Michie 1993).

131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7609(c) (West 1993); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 32.1-36.1(A)(1l) (Michie 1997).
132. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2, at § 1.5.
133. See infra II.
134. See infra II.A.
135. See infra II.
136. Gostin, supra note 48, at 688.
137. Id.
138. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 35, 37-40 (1988).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Gostin, supra note 48, at 48.
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III. THE MISSION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
AND CRIMINAL LAW
Assessing the role of PCRS counselors in
abating cases of willful exposure to HIV infection necessitates an examination of the degree
to which such efforts are consistent with the
mission of public health. Public health has always been primarily about the health of populations,136 as well as the health of individuals. 137
Public health has as its broadest mission the assurance of the conditions for people to be
healthy.l38 Principal among the many duties encompassed under this directive is the control of
threats to the health of the public,139 including
HIV/AIDS. 140 Though the federal government
and private sectors serve critical functions, accomplishing these duties is quintessentially the
responsibility of state governments pursuant to
their police powers. 141 These expansive powers,

HeinOnline -- 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 56 2001-2002

Hodge and Goslin/HANDLING CASES OF WILLFUL EXPOSURE

57

reserved exclusively to the states through the
Tenth Amendment of the federal Constitution,142 may be defined as the power of states to
regulate in the interests of the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the public. 143 In
the field of :?ublic health, state police powers
constitute thl~ original source of governmental
authority.144 Public health regulation is at the
core of the police power. 145
As an important part of a comprehensive
public health strategy to control the spread of
HIV, PCRS is consistent with the mission of
public health and thus, authorized via state police powers. Presumably, the mission of public
health requires the notification of persons who
are unknowingly at risk of infection due to the
willful conduct of others the same as it would
justify notification of persons at risk due to unintentional b~haviors. Yet, what if notification
of at risk individuals is not possible? For example, PCRS counselors may become aware of an
individual engaging in risky behaviors intending
to infect others, but the counselors may not
know the identity of these persons. Furthermore, even if notification occurs (because those
at risk can be identified), what should PCRS
counselors do if they know an individual is continuing to place others at risk? Should they
identify the individual to law enforcement authorities?
Although criminal charges against competent individuals with HIV who intentionally or
recklessly engage in unsafe sexual or needlesharing behaviors with unknowing partners are
authorized pursuant to state police powers,
criminal prosecution in such cases is considered
inconsistent with the public health ethic of voluntarism. 146 Intermeshing criminal sanctions in
areas of public health regulation undermines
the trust that individuals ideally should have in
public health services.

Without suggesting that these criminal
measures represent an appropriate or fair response to this or other public health issues, it is
important that PCRS counselors and public
health officials understand the nature of these
potential criminal sanctions. Realistically, criminal charges have previously been and will continue to be brought against individuals who willfully expose others to HIV and other
communicable diseases under general criminal
theory and STD- and HIV -specific offenses.
The following sections review criminal charges
potentially applicable to cases of willful exposure not for the purposes of condoning such
sanctions, but rather to explain them and the
problems in applying criminal law to cases of
willful exposure.

142. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of
New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 93, 95 (1997).
143. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism
and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 309 (1998).
144. Id. at 319.
145. Id. at 323·24.
146. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Po~/ers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49
OHIO ST. L. J. 1e17, 1041 (1989).
147. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 48.

148. Peter Slevin, Judge Sends a Message In Assault with
HIV, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at B7.
149. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1396
(W.D. Mich. 1993).
150. See, e.g., Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496,
499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
151. Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512, 513 (Md. 1996)
(charging defendant who knew he was HIV positive and
raped three women, with assault with intent to murder, reckless endangerment, and attempted murder).
152. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1045-48.

A. Criminal Offenses Generally
Individuals with HIV who have unsafe sex
or share drug injection equipment without informing their partners are committing a criminal act in most states. The theory of criminal
activity varies by state and depends on the severity of the individual's actions and the underlying facts. 147 Individuals who knowingly and intentionally engage in conduct risking
transmission of HIV may be charged with a variety of serious crimes, including murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary or reckless manslaughter, assaule 48 and battery/49 reckless
endangerment/ 50 or attempts at each of these
crimes (where infection does not arise or has
not yet resulted in the death of another).151
Many of these prosecutions, however, have
been brought against persons with HIV who engage in violent behaviors, such as biting or spitting on another, or who intentionally donate infected blood. 152 Few persons with HIV who
merely engage in unprotected sex with another
or share contaminated needles are charged with
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substantial offenses such as attempted murder
or other intentional crimes (for many of the
reasons discussed below). These criminal offenses, however, may be brought against egregious individuals who willfully expose others to
HIV.153
A "crime" may be defined as any intentional or reckless act done in violation of duties
which an individual owes to the community.154
Consequently, any criminal charge requires a
culpable mental state. In cases of willful exposure to HIV, this mental state may be of two
types: (1) intentional or knowing transmission;
or (2) reckless or negligent transmission. 155
Persons "intentionally" transmit HIV infection
(or attempt to transmit if infection does not reSUlt) if they have the conscious objective of
causing a harmful result, such as infection or
death.156 For example, an individual may intentionally engage in unsafe sexual or needle-sharing acts with another in order to kill the person
by infecting the person with HIV.157 Assuming
the facts support this level of criminal intent
(which is exceedingly difficult to ShOW),158 criminal charges based on the intentional nature of
the individual's actions may be brought. 159 Persons act "knowingly" if they have knowledge of
their infection and the modes of transmission or
if they reasonably should have known. Individuals with HIV act knowingly when they are practically certain that their conduct (unsafe sexual
or needle-sharing activity with another) will risk
harm (HIV infection) or death to another. 160
Proving that an individual knew he was infected at the time of the alleged criminal behavior may be difficult. Individuals may be anonymously tested for HIV.161 Even when
individuals are not tested anonymously, privacy
and confidentiality protections of health care
and public health information in some states

may prohibit the release of test results for criminal prosecutions. 162 Proving that an individual
knew his actions would transmit the virus is also
problematic. Epidemiological studies have
demonstrated the low probabilities of HIV
transmission through single instances of unsafe
sexual or needle-sharing practices. 163 HIV -positive individuals may assume, at times incorrectly, that their partners are also HIV-positive,
thus avoiding the risk of subsequent transmission. Even when actions occur over multiple
occasions with identifiable partners, individuals
may lack specific knowledge of the likely modes
of transmission. For these reasons, criminal
charges based on intentional or knowing exposure to HIV through unsafe sexual or needlesharing behavior are often unsuccessful. 164
Persons act "recklessly" when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable
risk (like the risk of transmitting HIV). Persons
act "negligently" when they should be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk, but are not
and act inconsistently with that risk. Under
criminal law theories, individuals who disregard
risks to others through their unsafe sexual or
needle-sharing behaviors deviate from the standard of conduct that reasonable, law-abiding
persons would adhere to in a similar situation.
This deviation from an accepted standard of
conduct may be classified as criminally reckless
or negligent, with resulting criminal charges
brought. Criminal charges for reckless or negligent exposure to HIV may technically be
framed against individuals who know that they
have HIV (or are simply at high risk of HIV
infection) and who engage in sexual or needlesharing activities with others (who mayor may
not be aware of the individual's infection) for
reasons other than intentionally or knowingly
attempting to cause harm to another. 165

153. See Smallwood, 680 A.2d at 513.
154. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (5th ed. 1979).
155. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1042-52.
156. Id. at 1042.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1043.
159. Id. at 1042.
160. See Burk v. State, 478 S.E.2d 416, 417 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996).
161. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) &
CDC National Prevention Information Network, Understanding the HIV Counseling and Testing Process, at http://
www.hivtest.orglconsumer/indexlhtm (last visited May 28,
2001).

162. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-492 (1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-D(2) (West 1964).
163. The estimated risk of HIV transmission for each instance of intravenous needle or syringe exposure is 0.67%.
CDC, Management of Possible Sexual, Injecting-Drug-Use, or
Other Nonoccupational Exposure to HIV, Including Considerations Related to Antiretroviral Therapy Public Health Service Statement, 47 MMWR 1 (Sept. 25, 1998), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/mmwrI998.html.
164. Gostin, supra note 146, at 1041, 1043.
165. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(2) (West Supp.
2001).
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As with intentional and knowing offenses,
numerous problems relate to prosecuting individuals with HIV under these theories of criminal culpability. First, it is difficult t~ s~~gest
that sexual activity represents a sIgmficant
deviation frem the reasonable person's standard of conduct. Sexual activity is a common
behavioral trait. While CDC recommends sexual abstinenc,:! or cessation of drug use for those
with HIV,166 its PCRS Guidelines acknowledge
a full range of client-centered counseling alternatives,167 induding the need to provide counseling in methods that reduce or eliminat.e the
risk of transmission during sexual mtercourse. 168 Provided such practices are used, individuals with HIV may engage in sexual activities with little to no risk to others. 169
Second, utilizing a reckless or negligent
standard for criminal culpability widens the
pool of individuals who may be prosecuted.
Under such theories, it is not necessary to show
an individual knew he was infected with HIV
before charg:~ng the individual with criminal
conduct. 17o
Third, imposing a reckless or negligent
standard fails to target individuals whose conduct is truly blameworthy. The breadth of such
theories could criminalize, for example, the activities of an individual with HIV who is engaged in a long-term, consensual sexual. r~la
tionship with another individual. Pumshmg
individuals who lack evil or antisocial intentions
while engaging in activities with others who are
aware of the risks is antithetical to public health
and criminal practice.
Fourth, the broad use of criminal law to deter individual conduct may deleteriously effect
public health, specifically where it discoura¥~s
at risk individuals from being tested and partlcIpating with PCRS.

166. CDC, HI" COUNSELING, TESTING AND REFERRAL
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES (1994).
167. DHHS & CDC, supra note 2.
168. ld. § 1.2.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West Supp.
2001).
171. IDAHO CeDE § 39-607 (Michie 1949); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192 (West Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2001).
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B. STD- and HIV -specific Offenses
Many states have passed disease-specific
laws for sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs)
or communicable diseases in general (including
STDs).171 These varied laws make criminal the
knowing exposure of another to a STD (e.g.
syphilis or gonorrhea), where the following elements are shown: (1) individual knowledge of
infection with a STD; (2) engagement in sexual
behavior; and (3) the failure to disclose the infection to the sexual partner. l72 These statutes
typically designate such crimes as misdemeanors. 173 Criminal sentences for violations include
monetary fines or short periods of imprisonment. 174 Though the motivation for STD-specific statutes historically relates to controlling
the spread of these diseases, these statutes are
rarely enforced in the modern era for STDs besides HIV.
STD-specific offenses, however, may be
charged to individuals with HIV who engage in
unsafe sexual or needle-sharing activity in states
where HIV is classified as a STD.175 Some
states did not originally view HIV/AIDS as a
STD in the traditional sense, thus presenting a
gap in coverage for criminalizing such behaviors
among persons with the disease. In response to
this gap, some states created a new category of
HIV -specific offenses.
Dozens of states make it a crime to transmit or expose others to HIV.176 While HIV-~pe
cific statutes, like their STD counterparts, dIffer
in scope and application across states, all of
these laws make it a criminal offense for individuals to knowingly engage in some type of behavior which poses a risk of transmission of
HIV.l77 These behaviors may include sexual intercourse, needle-sharing, or otherwise attempting to transfer any "bodily fluid" to another. 178
As well, HIV-specific offenses do not generally
require a showing of individual intent. 179 The
state need only show that an individual (1)
knew he was infected with HIV;180 (2) engaged
172. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-607 (Michie 1949).
173. See id.
174. ld.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 1998).
176. CATHERINE HANSSENS, STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES
ON HIV TRANSMISSION (1998).
177. ld.
178. See generally Gostin, supra note 146, at 1041.
179. ld.
180. [d.
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in well-defined, risky behavior (like unsafe sex
or needle-sharing);181 and (3) failed to inform
his partner of the risk. 182
HIV-specific offense may carry significantly greater penalties than STD-specific offenses. Violations may constitute a felony, allowing for hefty monetary fines and lengthy
prison sentences. 183 In 1998, the Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, upheld the conviction and sentencing of a twenty-four year old
man to thirty years in prison for knowingly
transmitting HIV to a woman through unprotected sex. 184

duce the opportunity for ill-advised responses.
Law enforcement, mental health, and other relevant authorities at the state and federal levels
should be consulted during the development of
this plan to facilitate the assignment of responsibilities.
2. Determine Through Investigation the Existence of a Health Threat. Public health action
related to cases of willful exposure should not
be based on mere conjecture or unsubstantiated
statements. Public health departments and
their agents must be prepared to show the existence of a health threat resulting allegedly from
an individual's behavior by objective scientific
evidence from well-executed and organized epidemiologic investigations. The methods for
conducting these investigations without significantly infringing on individual privacy should
constitute a portion of the public health plan
(above) and be consistent with further recommendations.
3. Create Strong Protections for Privacy and
Security of Public Health Information Related to
Investigations of Cases of Willful Exposure. Information acquired or used as part of formal
and informal public health investigations of
cases of willful exposure is highly sensitive.
Public health departments must not disclose
this information to anyone from outside the department (or the circle of governmental authorities engaged in the investigation) unless those
persons have a compelling need for the information. Unwarranted disclosures, even if made
in the auspices of protecting public health, may
still violate federal and state privacy and antidiscrimination laws.
4. Seek Legal Assistance. The moment an
actual case of willful exposure is detected by
PCRS counselors or public health departments,
legal counsel should be consulted to determine
appropriate courses of action. State laws concerning the privacy of health information and
the duties of HCWs and others to warn persons
at risk of infection vary significantly. Counsel,
who are familiar with each state's laws and regulations, should assist the department in considering options for action, if necessary, without violating individual constitutional rights or

IV. GUIDELINES CONCERNING
WILLFUL EXPOSURE
As we have discussed, cases of willful exposure to HIV infection through unsafe sexual or
needle-sharing behaviors may arise under several contexts and implicate issues related to individual privacy, partner's right to know, public
health duties, and criminal sanctions. 185 Not all
instances of willful exposure require affirmative
public health action beyond traditional counseling and education services. PCRS counselors
may not need to act further when these measures abate a public health threat related to an
isolated case of willful exposure, either through
a change in the behavior of the individual who
exposed others or through the adoption of safe
practices by the partner of such individual. Persistent, systematic behaviors of some individuals who may intend to infect others may, however, place PCRS counselors in a precarious
position between respecting individual rights
and protecting public health. Many of these
cases will inevitably involve some difficult
trade-ofts on a per case basis. Some basic legal,
ethical, and practical recommendations that
public health departments and PCRS counselors should consider in handling cases of willful
exposure, however, are summarized below.
1. Develop a Public Health Plan. Public
health departments in conjunction with local
PCRS counselors should develop a set of standards and procedures applicable to most cases
of willful exposure. This plan may help clarify
public health duties and responsibilities and re181. [d.
182. [d.
183. IDAHO

CODE

§ 39-608 (Michie 1949).
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184. Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People
with H.!. V., N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at AI.
185. See infra Parts II - III.
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subjecting the department or its officials to civil
or criminal liability.
5. Pre-e}(amine the Public Health Impact of
Actions Taken. After consulting with legal
counsel and before taking any action to avert
such a risk to the public health, an expert assessment should be made of the likely public
health impact such action may have in the community based in part on the results of similar
actions in other cases. Immediate risks to identifiable members of the community resulting
from a case of willful exposure must be balanced against potential future risks to the public
health resulti,ng from improper, excessive, or
unintended actions. Individuals with prior
knowledge in handling cases of willful exposure
should be consulted.
6. Advise the Individual Before Public Actions Are Taken. To the extent possible, an individual who is allegedly engaging in the willful
exposure of others to HIV should be notified of
the public health department's planned course
of action. Such individuals are entitled to know
of the action!; taken in order to exercise their
legal and eth:lcal rights and potentially protect
themselves against potential retribution by aggrieved individuals.
7. Choose the Least Restrictive Alternative.
These standard procedures and options must be
exercised in accordance with a graded series of
less restrictive alternatives. 186 The public health
plan should require PCRS counselors to choose
the least restrictive alternative to accomplish
the public health goal. Increasingly serious interventions should be deployed only when less
restrictive alternatives have failed to avert an
identifiable ri:;k to the public health.
8. Be Cmltious About Disclosing Information. When action is deemed necessary, however, there are three general options which a
public health department or PCRS counselor
may take in n::sponse to a demonstrated case of
willful exposure of others to HIV. They may
disclose information about the exposure(s) to
(1) persons potentially at risk; (2) criminal justice, law enforcement, or other state or local authorities; or (3) the media.

Any known partners of an individual who
willfully exposes others to HIV should be specifically notified and counseled to practice safe
sexual and needle-sharing practices as soon as
possible provided the identity and other information concerning the individual allegedly responsible for the exposure is kept confidential.
If the identities of the sexual and needle-sharing
partners of such individuals are not easily verified or obtainable at all, a public health department may have to consider other options.
A more difficult decision arises when a
case of willful exposure reveals that designated
persons may be exposed to infection in the future without their knowledge. For example, a
public health investigation may conclude that
an individual with HIV targets single women at
a local college. Deciding whether to notify the
community of persons at risk is highly complex.
Public health departments must weigh the benefits to the group, less restrictive alternatives,
and the impact on public health efforts. In
other cases, the class of individuals, however,
may be too diverse or large to reach through
specific notices (e.g., an individual targets married women in a large metropolitan area).
Other options may need to be considered in
these cases, including providing specific notice
to the affected population of the general threat
of the spread of communicable disease through
unsafe sexual activity.
To avert the risks to a population or identifiable individuals, PCRS counselors and public
health departments may need to alert criminal
justice, law enforcement, or other state or local
authorities (e.g. substance abuse counselors,
mental health practitioners, or state health care
workers) of an individual's criminal behavior.
This option should be pursued only with compelling evidence of a significant and imminent
danger to the public health or identifiable persons and if there are no less intrusive ways to
avert the harm. Such notices should only be
made after (a) confirming the identity of the individual allegedly willfully exposing others; (b)
confirming the individual's intention to further
expose others to HIV (whether by direct evidence or compelling circumstantial evidence

186. The first of these alternatives may likely be to contact
the individual allegedly exposing others to infection, attempt
to coun.;el the individual on the need to practice safe sexual

and needle-sharing behaviors, and obtain the identity of his
partners for purposes of notification.
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such as a demonstrated pattern of exposures);
(c) consulting legal counsel to examine whether
state privacy or public health law allows the release of identifiable public health information
to such entities by public health departments;
and (d) examining the public health impact of
such disclosure.
While public health departments may initially assist a criminal investigation with such information, they should not provide any additional assistance or become inter-meshed or
associated with the criminal investigation. Public health authorities must avoid at all costs an
image in the community as actively assisting in
the criminal investigation of persons. 187
There may even be instances where disclosure of individually-identifiable information to
local media may be warranted, but these are extremely rare. Such disclosures of individual information are the most offensive to principles
of individual privacy and are usually more extensive than needed. Broadcast and print media may help to serve the public health objective of warning diverse groups or larger
populations of known risks resulting from individuals who willfully expose others to HIV, or
assisting with the collection of information
about such cases. However, disclosures of sensitive information to the media, such as a person's HIV status and name, identity, or picture,
may present more opportunity for harm than
public health good. Media sources may unfairly
depict individual behavior, improperly report
the circumstances of a given case, initiate their
own investigations of individual conduct, arouse
needless fear among populations, and otherwise

deplete public health resources by manufacturing ill-advised public health responses (such as
mass HIV testing) among populations to an
otherwise legitimate though limited public
health threat.

187. Occasionally, law enforcement authorities may approach public health departments with requests for information related to separate investigations of cases of willful exposure. While the circumstances underlying such requests
vary and the degree to which such information may be pro-

vided depends greatly on state laws, public health departments generally should resist providing authorities any identifiable information in the absence of a compelling public
health purpose.
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V. CONCLUSION
PCRS counselors and local public health
departments may uncover cases of willful exposure of HIV as part of their broader roles in
protecting the public health. Each incident
presents counselors with a difficult series of
choices. Should the privacy rights of an individual who intentionally tries to infect others be
respected through PCRS, or should the right to
know of unsuspecting partners predominate?
Does the mission of public health suggest a role
for these public health authorities to abate willful exposures of HIV? Criminal remedies may
be available-should these be pursued and by
whom? When should disclosures of sensitive
public health information be made? Without
dictating the actions of PCRS counselors concerning these cases, we have attempted to guide
their responses through information and process-oriented recommendations. Ultimately,
each case of willful exposure may need to be
addressed on ~ case by case basis. Like the disease itself, however, exposure of unknowing
persons to HIV through the intentional risky
behaviors of infected individuals is a largely
preventable public health problem which requires an educated, informed, and guided public health response.
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